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Abstract—Wireless Body Area Networks (WBANs) play an 
important role in healthcare system by enabling medical experts 
to guide patients remotely. The unauthorized access of medical 
data from WBAN controller as well as the unreliable data 
communication may leads to risk for patients life. Currently, 
Chunqiang Hu et al., [1] proposed a data communication 
protocol by using Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption 
(CP-ABE) for a single file. The major limitation of Chunqiang 
Hu et al., [1] is that as the number of files increases, CP-ABE will 
suffer from parameters such as message size, energy consumption 
and computation cost. This paper proposes a more secure and 
efficient data communication scheme for WBANs by using an 
efficient File Hierarchy CP-ABE (FH-CP-ABE). The proposed 
scheme uses integrated access structure which is a combination of 
two or more access structures with hierarchical files encrypted. 
We evaluate the performance analysis of the proposed data 
communication protocol in terms of message size, energy 
consumption, computation cost and compared with Chunqiang 
Hu et al., [1]. 
 
Index Terms—Computer Communication Networks, Data 
Encryption, Electronic Health Record, Health Communication, 
Task Performance and Analysis.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Recently, Wireless body area networks (WBANs) [1], [2], [3] 
have been gaining more attention in modern E-healthcare 
systems by providing an appropriate way for monitoring the 
human body using intelligent light-weight wearable or 
implantable sensors. Accordingly, medical specialists can 
utilize this real time information from WBAN to provide 
timely advices and medical treatments to patients. Figure 1 
shows the system model for WBAN in a healthcare system. 
The system consists of four parts namely Key Authority, 
Wearable and implanted sensors, WBAN Controller and a 
Data Consumer. 
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The critical functions of key authority include system 
initialization, public parameters generation, and assigning 
secret key for each of the data consumer. The generated public 
parameters are installed in to the sensors before they are 
implanted or hooked up in the human body. A WBAN consists 
of wireless sensors which are used to monitor vital human 
body actions (e.g., motion sensors) and parameters (e.g., body 
temperature, blood pressure, pulse (heart rate), and breathing 
rate (respiratory rate) [4]. Implanted devices endure from 
resource constraints such as battery power, storage etc. On the 
contrary, wearable devices have fewer resource constraints. 
The sensor devices encrypt patient’s data and store the 
ciphertext in the WBAN controller. WBAN controller is 
typically used to store the patient’s ciphertext data. When an 
authorised data consumer (doctors, nurses, healthcare experts) 
needs to access the data, the person should communicate with 
the WBAN controller to retrieve the ciphertext data. Despite 
of the uses, WBANs also raises some major privacy and 
security concerns, mainly unauthorized data access and 
message modification. Chunqiang Hu et. al [1] addressed 
solutions to these problems by proposing a Secure and 
Efficient Data Communication Protocol by using CP-ABE for 
a single file. The major limitation of Chunqiang Hu et. al [1] 
is, as the number of files increases, CP-ABE will suffer from 
parameters such as larger message size, high communication
 
Fig. 1. System model for WBAN in a healthcare system 
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overhead, high energy consumption and high computation 
cost. Thus the main motivation of this paper is to significantly 
improve these parameters when the number of files increases. 
 
A. Our Contributions  
The contributions of this paper are highlighted as follows: 
1. We propose an efficient scheme for secure data 
communications in WBANs using FH-CP-ABE for 
multiple hierarchical files in a single encryption.  
2. We evaluate the performance analysis of the proposed 
scheme in terms of message size, energy consumption, 
computation cost and compared with [1]. 
B. Paper Organization  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II deals 
with the preliminaries. Section III presents the proposed 
scheme using FH-CP-ABE. Section IV presents the 
performance analysis of the proposed scheme. Section V 
concludes the paper. 
 
II. PRELIMINARIES  
A. Bilinear Map  
Let 𝐺1, 𝐺2and 𝐺𝑇 are three cyclic groups of prime order q. 
𝐺1 and 𝐺2 are a source group and 𝐺𝑇 is a target group. Let 𝑔1 
and 𝑔2 are generators of 𝐺1 and 𝐺2 respectively. A bilinear 
map 𝑒  is defined as 𝑒: 𝐺1  ×  𝐺2  →  𝐺𝑇 which has the 





𝑎𝑏 , where 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈  ℤ𝑝. 
2. Computability: The bilinear map e is efficiently 
computable by 𝐺1  ×  𝐺2 for any pairs. 
3. Non-degeneracy: 𝑒(𝑔1, 𝑔2) ≠  1. It means all pairs of 
source group do not map to the identity of the target 
group. 
 
Note: If 𝐺1 = 𝐺2, then it is a symmetric map, otherwise it is 
an asymmetric map. 
 
B. Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption  
Let a, b, c, z ∈  ℤ𝑝be chooses at random. DBDH problem in 
group 𝐺 of prime order 𝑞 and 𝑔 is the generator of the group is 
a problem that no polynomial time adversary is able to 
distinguish the tuple (𝑔a, 𝑔b, 𝑔c, e(𝑔, 𝑔)abc) from the tuple 
(𝑔a, 𝑔b, 𝑔c, e(𝑔, 𝑔)z) with a non-negligible advantage [6]. 
 
(|𝑃𝑟[𝒜(𝑔, 𝑔a, 𝑔b, 𝑔c, e(𝑔, 𝑔)abc) = 0]
− 𝑃𝑟[𝒜(𝑔, 𝑔a, 𝑔b, 𝑔c, e(𝑔, 𝑔)z) = 0]| ≥ ε) 
 
III. PROPOSED SCHEME 
The bilinear map 𝑒: 𝐺1 × 𝐺1 → 𝐺𝑇, 𝐺1be the source group 
of prime order 𝑝 and 𝐺𝑇 be the target group. Let 𝑔 be the 
generator of the group𝐺1. Let Lagrange Co-efficient ∆𝑘,𝑆=
∏ (𝑥 − 𝑙)/(𝑘 − 𝑙)𝑙∈𝑆,𝑙≠𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ ℤ𝑝 and an attribute set 𝑆 =
{𝑆1, 𝑆2, … , 𝑆𝑚  ∈ ℤ𝑝}. Let 𝐻1: {0,1}
∗ be the hash functions for 
the group 𝐺1. An attribute universe set is defined as ?̃? =
{𝑎1, 𝑎2, … , 𝑎𝑛}. In this section, we propose a more efficient 
Secure and Efficient Data Communication Protocol for 
WBANs by using an efficient File Hierarchy CP-ABE (FH-
CP-ABE) [7]. We use the integrated access structure which is 
a combination of two or more access structures with the 
hierarchical files encrypted. The proposed scheme has two 
kinds of data communications. First, the data communication 
between data consumer and WBAN controller. It consists of 
four algorithms, namely, setup, key generation, encryption and 
decryption. Second, the data communication between data 
consumer and sensors. It consists of three steps, namely, 
initialization, connection establishment and communication. 
The steps for data communication between data consumer and 
WBAN controller are detailed as follows:  
 
𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑝(1𝜆): This algorithm is executed by the key authority 
and it takes as input a security parameter 𝜆 and 
chooses 𝜂, 𝜘 ∈𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑙𝑦 ℤ𝑝. It generates public key (𝑃𝐾) and 
master secret key (𝑀𝑆𝐾) as the output which is calculated in 
equation (1) as follows:   
   
 {𝑃𝐾 = {𝐺1, 𝑔, 𝑔
𝜘 , 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝜂}, 𝑀𝑆𝐾 = { 𝑔𝜂 , 𝜘}}            (1)         
 
𝐾𝑒𝑦 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑃𝐾, 𝑀𝑆𝐾, 𝑆): This algorithm is executed 
by the key authority and it takes as input, public key (𝑃𝐾), 
master secret key (𝑀𝑆𝐾) and an attribute set 𝑆(𝑆 ⊆ ?̃?). 
Choose 𝑟𝑠𝑛 ∈𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑙𝑦 ℤ𝑝 and 𝐶𝐾𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 = 𝑟𝑠𝑛and compute the    
verification key,𝐶𝐾𝑣𝑒𝑟 = 𝑔
𝑟𝑠𝑛  . Choose  𝑟, 𝑟𝑗 ∈𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑙𝑦 ℤ𝑝 for 
each user and each attribute 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆. It produces secret key (𝑆𝐾) 
as the output which is calculated in equation (2) as follows: 
 
           𝑆𝐾 = {
𝐷 = 𝑔𝜂+𝜘.𝑟




}              (2)                                     
 
It sends the 𝑆𝐾 and 𝑟𝑠𝑛 to the owner of the attribute set 𝑆 and 
distribute 𝐶𝐾𝑣𝑒𝑟  for others. 
 
𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑃𝐾, 𝑐𝑘, 𝑇): This algorithm is executed by the 
sensor. Let us assume that the data owner shares 𝑘 files, 
i.e.,𝑀 = {𝑚1, 𝑚2, … , 𝑚𝑘} with 𝑘 access level and 
corresponding content keys 𝑐𝑘 = {𝑐𝑘1, 𝑐𝑘2, … , 𝑐𝑘𝑘}. It takes 
as input the  public key (𝑃𝐾), content keys (𝑐𝑘) and 
hierarchical access structure 𝑇. It produces as output the 
ciphertext 𝐶𝑇, which can be calculated as the follows: 
 
1.  The level nodes (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖), (𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑘]) are set by the data 
owner in access structure 𝑇 with 𝑘 access levels and its 
hierarchy is sorted from highest to lowest, i.e., (𝑥1, 𝑦1) is the 
highest hierarchy and (𝑥𝑘 , 𝑦𝑘) is the lowest hierarchy. For 𝑘 
chosen numbers 𝛼1, 𝛼2, … , 𝛼𝑘 ∈𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑙𝑦 ℤ𝑝, 
 
𝐶?̃? = 𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)
𝜂𝛼𝑖 , 𝐶𝑖
′ = 𝑔𝛼𝑖 , ∀𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑘                  (3)                     
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2.   In access structure 𝑇, for each node (𝑥, 𝑦), a polynomial 
𝑞(𝑥,𝑦)has to be selected. The node information of 
polynomial𝑞(𝑥,𝑦) for root node 𝑅 is randomly chosen as top to 
bottom fashion. The degree of the polynomial is 
𝑑𝑒𝑔(𝑥,𝑦),𝑑𝑒𝑔(𝑥,𝑦) = 𝑘(𝑥,𝑦) − 1, 0 < 𝑘(𝑥,𝑦) ≤ 𝑛𝑢𝑚(𝑥,𝑦), where 
𝑘(𝑥,𝑦) is the threshold value of node (𝑥, 𝑦) and 𝑛𝑢𝑚(𝑥,𝑦) is the 
number of children for node (𝑥, 𝑦) in 𝑇. The threshold value 
𝑘(𝑥,𝑦) can be calculated as follows:     
 
 𝑘(𝑥,𝑦) = {
𝑛𝑢𝑚(𝑥,𝑦), (𝑥, 𝑦) 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑓 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒(𝐴𝑁𝐷 𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒)
1, (𝑥, 𝑦) 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑓 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒(𝑂𝑅 𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒)
1, (𝑥, 𝑦) 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑓 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒
 
 
3.   The data owner starts from the root node 𝑅 and sets the 
polynomial 𝑞𝑅(0) = 𝑞(𝑥1,𝑦1) = 𝛼1 and the degree  𝑑𝑒𝑔(𝑥1,𝑦1) 
of the root node. For rest of the nodes,            
                  
𝑞(𝑥,𝑦)(0) = {




Where parent(x, y) be the parent of node (x, y) and 
index(x, y) return the unique value associated with node 
(x, y). Let Y be set of leaf node in access structure T and for 




′ = 𝐻1(𝑎𝑡𝑡(𝑥, 𝑦))
𝑞(𝑥,𝑦)(0)                (4)        
 
Where att(x, y) are the attributes linked with the leaf node 
in T. 
4.   Let 𝑋 be the set of transport node (i.e. one of the children 
containing at least one threshold gate) and 𝑇𝑁 − 𝑇𝐺(𝑥, 𝑦) be 
the threshold gate set of transport nodes of(𝑥, 𝑦) children, i.e.,  
𝑇𝑁 − 𝑇𝐺(𝑥, 𝑦) = {𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑1 , 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑2, … , 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑗 , … } and for each 
nodes in 𝑋 the data owner computes,  
 




𝜂.𝑞(𝑥,𝑦)(0))},    (5)        
        ∀𝑗 = 1,2, ….                                                                         
 
5.   The final output of encryption algorithm is: 
 






},                 (6) 
                                   ∀i = 1,2, … , k and ∀j = 1,2, …                                           
 
𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡(𝑃𝐾, 𝐶𝑇, 𝑆𝐾): A user decrypts the ciphertext 𝐶𝑇 
with the help of public key (𝑃𝐾) and secret key (𝑆𝐾). First we 
define the recursive operation 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡𝑁𝑜𝑑𝑒 (𝐶𝑇, 𝑆𝐾, (𝑥, 𝑦)). 
If the recursive operation takes as input a leaf node (𝑥, 𝑦), it 
should be computed as, 
 
𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡𝑁𝑜𝑑𝑒(𝐶𝑇, 𝑆𝐾, (𝑥, 𝑦)) = 
{
𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙, 𝑖 = 𝑎𝑡𝑡(𝑥, 𝑦) ∌ 𝑆
𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡𝑁𝑜𝑑𝑒(𝐶𝑇, 𝑆𝐾, (𝑥, 𝑦)), 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 





= 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝑟𝜘𝑞(𝑥,𝑦)(0)    (7)                                                                                               
If the recursive operation takes as input a non leaf node 
(𝑥, 𝑦)it should be computed as follows: 
The operation 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡𝑁𝑜𝑑𝑒(𝐶𝑇, 𝑆𝐾, 𝑧) runs if and only if 
all the elements in set 𝑧 are the children of (𝑥, 𝑦) and the result 
will be stored as 𝐹𝑧. It can be calculated as follows: 
                       
    𝐹𝑧 = {
𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙, 𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝐹(𝑥,𝑦), 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
                          (8)                        
 
Let 𝑆(𝑥,𝑦) be the 𝑘(𝑥,𝑦) − 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 child nodes of set 𝑧.𝐹(𝑥,𝑦)can 
be calculated as follows: 





′ ={𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥(𝑧): 𝑧 ∈ 𝑆(𝑥,𝑦)}, 











= 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝑟𝜘𝑞(𝑥,𝑦)(0)       (9)                                                                                               
 
Thus the decryption step can be detailed as follows: 
 
1. If the attribute set 𝑆 satisfies the partial or whole 𝑇, then 




= 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝑟𝜘𝛼𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑘] 




= 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝜂𝛼𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑘] 








= 𝑐𝑘𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑘] 
 
The computed cki is valid if  e(sig, g) = e(H1(cki), g
rsn).  
4. Finally, we decrypt the 𝑘 file {𝑚1, 𝑚2, … , 𝑚𝑘} with the 
help of 𝑘 content keys 𝑐𝑘𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑘] using symmetric 
technique. 
 
As like as in [1], we follow the same procedure for data 
communication between data consumer and sensors. For real 
time applications, we recommend to change the revocation 
time periodically. Periodically updating the secret key is 
highly secure for real time applications. 
 
A. Proposed Scheme: Proof of Security 
Theorem 1: Under Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman 
(DBDH) assumptions, no polynomial time attacker can 
selectively break the proposed system. 
Proof: The security game is based on the hardness of the 
DBDH assumption. Suppose attacker 𝑎𝑡𝑘 can win the FH-CP-
ABE game with advantage 𝜀. We construct a simulator 𝑠𝑖𝑚 




. Let 𝐺1 be the source group and 𝐺𝑇 be the target 
group. Let 𝑔 be the generator of the group𝐺1. The challenger 
chooses the fair binary coin ɦ ∈ {0,1}, 𝑔 ∈ 𝐺1, 𝑅 ∈ 𝐺𝑇 and 
𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐 ∈  ℤ𝑝. If ɦ = 0, then the challenger defines 𝑇 to be 
𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝑎𝑏𝑐. Otherwise, he sets 𝑇 = 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝑧 𝑜𝑟 𝑅.  
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Fig. 2. Message size versus Number of files 
 
The challenger then gives the simulator the DBDH details 
and then simulator 𝑠𝑖𝑚 now plays the role of challenger in the 
security game. 
𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡: During the init phase, 𝑠𝑖𝑚receives the challenge 
access structure 𝒜∗  from attacker 𝑎𝑡𝑘. 
𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑝: To provide a public key 𝑃𝐾 to 𝑎𝑡𝑘, 𝑠𝑖𝑚 randomly 
chooses 𝜂′ ∈ ℤ𝑝and note 𝜂 = 𝜂
′ + 𝑎𝑏. It calculates 𝑒(𝑔1, 𝑔2)
𝜂 
as: 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝜂 = 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝜂
′
. 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝑎𝑏. Finally, 𝑠𝑖𝑚 sends public 
key 𝑃𝐾 to 𝑎𝑡𝑘. 
𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒 1: During this phase, 𝑎𝑡𝑘 submits an attribute set 
𝒲𝑗 ∈ 𝒜 such that 𝒲𝑗 ∉ 𝒜
∗, to 𝑠𝑖𝑚. Simulator 𝑠𝑖𝑚 chooses 
𝑟′ ∈𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑙𝑦 ℤ𝑝 and sets 𝑟 = 𝑟
′ − 𝑎. It can be obtained as 
follows:  





For each attribute in 𝒲𝑗 , 𝑠𝑖𝑚 has to choose 𝑟𝑗 ∈𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑙𝑦 ℤ𝑝. It 









′ = 𝑔𝑏𝑟𝑗 . Finally, 𝑠𝑖𝑚 sends 
the 𝑆𝐾 to 𝑎𝑡𝑘. 
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒: The attacker 𝑎𝑡𝑘 submits two equal length 
messages m1 and m2 along with a challenge access structure 
𝒜∗. 𝑠𝑖𝑚 randomly generates a bit ɦ̂ ∈ {0,1} and computes 
𝐶𝑇∗ as 𝐶′ = 𝑔𝑎 = 𝑔𝑐 ,?̃? = 𝑚ɦ̂. 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)
𝜂𝛼 = 𝑚ɦ̂. 𝑇. 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)
𝜂′𝛼. 
Finally, 𝑠𝑖𝑚 sends the 𝐶𝑇∗ to  𝑎𝑡𝑘. 
𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒 2: Same as the Phase 1. 
𝐺𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑠: The attacker 𝑎𝑡𝑘 outputs a guess ɦ̂′of ɦ̂. If ɦ̂ = ɦ̂′, 
simulator𝑠𝑖𝑚 guess that 𝑇 = 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝑎𝑏𝑐. Otherwise, 𝑇 is a 
random target group element in  𝐺𝑇. 
The advantage of the attacker is 𝜀, when  𝑇 = 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝑎𝑏𝑐. 
The advantage of the attacker is 
1
2
, when 𝑇 is a random target 
group element in 𝐺𝑇. Finally, the advantage of the simulator in 





IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS  
This section deals with the performance analysis of the 
proposed scheme in terms of message size, energy 
consumption on communications and computation cost. 
A. Message Size  
The total message size of proposed decryption scheme 
during communication between data consumer and the BAN 
controller connection can be computed as  
 
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 = |𝐼𝐷𝑠| + |𝐼𝐷𝑑| + |𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝐶𝐾)| = 
|𝐼𝐷𝑠| + |𝐼𝐷𝑑| + |𝑇| + |𝐶?̃?| + |𝐶𝑖
′| + |𝐶(𝑥,𝑦)| + |𝐶(𝑥,𝑦)
′ | + |?̂?(𝑥,𝑦),𝑗| + |𝑠𝑖𝑔| = 
1 + 1 + 4 + 𝑘|𝑝| + 𝑘|𝑝| + |𝑝| + |𝑝| + 𝑗|𝑝| + 𝑘|𝑝| = 
 (3𝑘 + 𝑗 + 2)|𝑝| + 6. 
 
It is sufficient for𝐼𝐷𝑠,𝐼𝐷𝑑 and 𝑇 to have one byte, one byte 
and four bytes respectively for a WBAN. The elliptic curve is 
defined over 𝔽𝑝. The message size of the proposed data 
consumer and the WBAN controller communication is 
(16𝑘 + 2) 𝑏𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑠. Similarly, total message size of proposed 
decryption for communication between data consumer and the 
sensor connection can be computed as 
 
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 = |𝐼𝐷| + |𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝐶𝐾 ∥ 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒)| + |𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝐶𝐾 ∥ 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒)| = 
|𝐼𝐷| + |𝑇| + |𝐶?̃?| + |𝐶𝑖
′| + |𝐶(𝑥,𝑦)| + |𝐶(𝑥,𝑦)
′ | + |?̂?(𝑥,𝑦),𝑗| + |𝑠𝑖𝑔|
+ |𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝐶𝐾 ∥ 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒)| = 
1 + 4 + 𝑘|𝑝| + 𝑘|𝑝| + |𝑝| + |𝑝| + 𝑗|𝑝| + 𝑘|𝑝| + 16𝑘 =
(3𝑘 + 𝑗 + 2)|𝑝| + 16𝑘 + 5.  
 
The message size of the proposed data consumer and the 
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[1] in 𝑏𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑠 
Data consumer and the 
WBAN controller 
connection 
((3𝑘 + 𝑗 + 2) |𝑝|
+ 6) 
(5 |𝑝| + 6) 𝑘 
Data consumer and the 
sensor connection 
((3𝑘 + 𝑗 + 2) |𝑝|
+ 16𝑘 + 5) 
(5 |𝑝| + 21) 𝑘 
Data consumer and the 
WBAN controller 
communication 
(16𝑘 + 2) 18𝑘 
Data consumer and the 
sensor communication 
(32𝑘 + 2) 34𝑘 
The number of files is k. 
The prime order of the group is 𝑝. 
The Number of transport nodes which carry any information about level 
node is 𝑗. 
 
Table I shows the message size of the proposed scheme and 
Chunqiang Hu et al., [1]. Figure 2 illustrates the relationship 
between the message size and the number of files of the 
proposed scheme and [1]. For this experiment, the security 
level  𝑝 = 64 𝑏𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑠 and number of files k = {2,4,6,8}. It 
clearly shows that, as the number of files are increased, the 
message size of the proposed scheme is significantly getting 
reduced when compared with [1]. In this experiment we 
consider communications between data consumer and WBAN 
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controller/sensors. In the proposed scheme, we observe that 
the message size has a linear relationship with the number of 
files for establishing a connection between data consumer and 
WBAN controller/sensors. We can also find that the proposed 
scheme shows a drastic improvement when compared with the 
schemes in [1]. Once the connection is established, the 
message size of the proposed scheme shows slight 
improvement when compared with the schemes in [1].  
 
B. Energy Consumption on Communications  
As noted in [8], a Chipcon CC1000 radio which is used in 
Crossbow MICA2DOTmotes [9] utilizes 28.6 µ𝐽 to receive 
one byte and 59.2 µ𝐽 to transmit one byte. For the proposed 
data consumer and the WBAN controller connections, the total 
energy consumption in 𝑚𝐽 of one data transmission is 
 
((3𝑘 + 𝑗 + 2) |𝑝| + 6)(28.6 + 59.2) / 1000 =  
((0.2634𝑘 + 0.0878𝑗 + 0.1756) |𝑝| + 0.5268)                       (10)             
 
After the connection establishment, the energy consumption 
in 𝑚𝐽 is 
 
(16𝑘 + 2)(28.6 + 59.2) /1000 = (1.4048𝑘 + 0.1756)             (11)     
 
The total energy consumption in 𝑚𝐽 for the proposed 
communication for 𝑁 transmissions is  
 
(((0.2634𝑘 + 0.0878𝑗 + 0.1756) |𝑝| + 0.5268)
+ (1.4048𝑘 + 0.1756) (𝑁 − 1)) = 
((1.4048𝑘 + 0.1756)𝑁 + (0.2634𝑘 + 0.0878𝑗 + 0.1756) |𝑝| −
1.4048𝑘 + 0.3512)                                                                (12) 
 
For the proposed data consumer and the sensor connections, 
the total energy consumption in 𝑚𝐽 of one data transmission is 
 
(2 ((3𝑘 + 𝑗 + 2) |𝑝| + 16𝑘 + 5) (28.6 + 59.2) /1000) = 
((0.5268𝑘 + 0.1756𝑗 + 0.3512) |𝑝| + 2.8096𝑘 + 0.878)        (13)                                                         
 
After the connection establishment, the energy consumption 
in 𝑚𝐽 is 
(32𝑘 + 2) (28.6 + 59.2) /1000 = (2.8096𝑘 + 0.1756)              (14) 
 
The total energy consumption in 𝑚𝐽 for the proposed 
communication for 𝑁 transmissions is 
 
(((0.5268𝑘 + 0.1756𝑗 + 0.3512) |𝑝| + 2.8096𝑘 + 0.878) +
(2.8096𝑘 + 0.1756) (𝑁 − 1)) = ((2.8096𝑘 + 0.1756)𝑁 +
(0.5268𝑘 + 0.1756𝑗 + 0.3512) |𝑝| + 0.7024)                         (15)                                                  
 
The total energy consumption of some of the other schemes 
such as certificate-based scheme, Merkle hash tree based 
scheme, and ID-based scheme are 146.99𝑁 𝑚𝐽, 144.56𝑁 𝑚𝐽 
and 111.02𝑁 𝑚𝐽 respectively [9]. Table II shows the energy 
consumption for communications of the proposed scheme and 
Chunqiang Hu et al., [1]. Figure 3 illustrates the energy 
consumption for communications of the proposed scheme and 
[1] when the number of transmissions 𝑁 = 100, security level  
𝑝 = 64 𝑏𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑠 and number of files k = {2,4,6,8}. It clearly 
shows that the proposed scheme has lower energy 
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 Proposed Scheme in 𝑚𝐽 
Chunqiang Hu et 
al., [1] in 𝑚𝐽 
Data consumer and 




+ ((0.2634𝑘 + 0.0878𝑗
+ 0.1756) |𝑝|)

















− 0.7024) 𝑘 
 
The number of files is k. 
The prime order of the group is 𝑝. 
The Number of transport nodes which carry any information about level 
node is 𝑗. 
The number of transmissions is 𝑁. 
 
C. Computation Cost  
As noted in [10], the computation cost of Tate pairing on a 
32-bit ST22 smartcard microprocessor running at 33 MHz is 
752 𝑚𝑠 approximately. We examine the computation 
overhead of the proposed scheme on a 32-bit Intel PXA255 
processor running at 400 MHz. The computation cost of Tate 
pairing on a 32-bit Intel PXA255 is ((33/400) × 752 ≈
62.04 ) 𝑚𝑠. For establishing connection, the computation cost 
of the proposed data consumer and the WBAN controller 
communications is obtained by (3𝑘 + 𝑗 + 2) Tate pairing. The 
total computation cost for establishing connection is ((3𝑘 +
𝑗 + 2) 62.04) 𝑚𝑠. After connection establishment, the data 
consumers do not require to compute Tate pairing again until 
the content key is renewed. For establishing connection, the 
computation cost of theproposed data consumer and the sensor 
 
 
Fig. 3. Energy consumption on communications with regard to the number 
of files 
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communications is obtained by (6𝑘 + 2𝑗 + 4) Tate pairing. 
The total computation cost for establishing connection is 
((6𝑘 + 2𝑗 + 4) 62.04 ) 𝑚𝑠. After connection establishment, 
the data consumers do not require to compute Tate pairing 
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al., [1] in 𝑚𝑠 




+ 2) 62.04) 
(5𝑘 × 62.04) 
Data consumer and the 
sensor communication 
((6𝑘 + 2𝑗
+ 4) 62.04) 
(10𝑘 × 62.04) 
The number of files is k. 
The prime order of the group is 𝑝. 
The Number of transport nodes which carry any information about 
level node is 𝑗. 
 
 
The computation cost of some of the other schemes such as 
certificate-based scheme, Merkle hash tree based scheme, and 
ID-based scheme are 36.96𝑁 𝑚𝑠, 18.48𝑁 𝑚𝑠 and 
124.08𝑁 𝑚𝑠 respectively [9]. Table III shows the 
computation cost of the proposed scheme and Chunqiang Hu 
et al., [1]. Figure 4 illustrates the computation cost of the 
proposed scheme and [1] when the number of files are 
increased. It clearly shows that the proposed scheme has a 
lower computation cost than the schemes in [1]. When we 
consider the energy consumption incurred by both 
computation and communications, our proposed scheme is 
relatively efficient when the number of files k is increased. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS 
In this paper, we proposed an efficient data communication for 
WBANs by using a File Hierarchy CP-ABE (FH-CP-ABE). 
The proposed scheme uses integrated access structure to solve 
the problem of multiple hierarchical files sharing in WBAN. 
This enables sensors to share multiple files in a single 
encryption. As a result, the consumers can decrypt all 
authorization files by computing secret key once. Performance 
analysis of the proposed scheme is evaluated in terms of 
parameters such as message size, energy consumption and 
computation cost. The results show that the proposed scheme 
is more efficient than schemes in [1]. In future, we would like 
to extend this scheme to include policy updating and multi-
authority CP-ABE in WBAN. 
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